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Capitalization of Capital Gains Taxes:
Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to the 1997 Rate Reduction
1. Introduction
This paper examines whether stock prices are discounted for potential capital gains taxes.
The extent to which shareholder taxes affect stock prices is central to firm valuation and tax
policy and has long intrigued scholars in economics, finance, and accounting.  To date, the
controversy has largely centered on whether dividend taxes are capitalized in equity values.  This
paper extends the discussion to consider whether capital gains taxes are capitalized.  The equity
capitalization of capital gains taxes is assessed by evaluating stock price reactions around a likely
change in expected capital gains tax rates, namely the May 1997 budget accord that led to a
reduction in the long-term capital gains tax rate from 28 percent to 20 percent.
1
Shareholders can pay capital gains taxes on trades in the secondary market, share
repurchases, and liquidating distributions.  Because dividends reduce current stock prices and
future liquidation values, reductions in the expected capital gains tax rate should be particularly
value-enhancing to firms that do not pay dividends or pay low dividends, ceteris paribus.  If
investors expect cross-sectional differences in the proportion of earnings ultimately to receive
capital gains treatment (e.g., because of dividend policy variation), company valuation should
vary cross-sectionally, based on differences between ordinary income and capital gains rates.
The purpose of this study is to determine whether such cross-sectional valuation differences can
be detected when expected capital gains tax rates change.
                                               
1 Realizations from capital transactions are subject to differing tax treatments depending on whether they are gains
or losses and how long the investor has owned the property.  Throughout the paper, references to the current capital
gains tax rate mean the most favorable long-term capital gains tax rate applied to net long-term capital gains.2
To date, few studies have investigated the effect of capital gains taxes on stock prices and
their findings have been inconclusive.  Inconsistent with capital gains tax capitalization,
Amoako-Adu, Rashid and Stebbins (1992) report stock prices reactions did not vary across
dividend yields when the Canadian government introduced a $500,000 lifetime capital gains
exemption in 1985.  Conversely, consistent with capital gains tax capitalization, they report that
high-dividend yield firms experienced a significantly smaller price decrease than low dividend
yield firms when the exemption was reduced to $100,000 in 1987.  They do not reconcile the
conflicting findings.  One possible explanation is that the second test is more powerful because
the second exemption amount is more binding for the marginal investor than the first.
Two concurrent papers examine capital gains tax capitalization using a residual-income
valuation model (Ohlson (1995)).  Harris and Kemsley (1999) infer that equity is discounted for
dividend taxes because the coefficient on retained earnings (their proxy for future dividends) in
their valuation model is less than the coefficient on other book value.  If capital gains taxes also
are capitalized, they reason that the coefficient on retained earnings should vary with the firm’s
dividend yield and should vary depending on whether the firm repurchases its shares.  No clear
patterns of variation emerge.
Collins and Kemsley (1998) extend the Harris-Kemsley model to incorporate the capital
gains taxes arising from secondary trading.  Examining 46,584 observations from 1975-1994,
they regress stock prices on book value, earnings, dividends, and the interactions of the
maximum statutory capital gains tax rate with earnings and dividends.  Consistent with their
predictions, they report that the coefficient on the earnings (dividend) interaction is negative
(positive).  They interpret the coefficients on the interaction terms as evidence that capital gains3
taxes reduce firm value through their effect on the valuation of earnings, but that firms can offset
this negative valuation effect by paying dividends.
However, Collins and Kemsley (1998) potentially suffer from a lack of variation in the
maximum statutory capital gains tax rates.  The capital gains tax rates were 28 percent in all
years, except 1975-1978, when they were 35 percent, and 1982-1986, when they were 20
percent.  Thus, the results are driven solely by differences between the study’s first four years
and the five years following the 1981 rate reduction and rely critically on controls for other
sources of variation between these two periods.  Furthermore, in years of legislative change in
the rates (i.e., 1978, 1981, and 1986), investors likely began to impound the capital gains tax rate
before it became effective in the following year.  Moreover, to the extent prices are set by the
expected capital gains tax rate, rather than the current statutory rate, it becomes difficult to
identify the relevant rate in several non-change years that were filled with speculation about
possible changes in the capital gains tax rate.
This paper avoids these research design problems by adopting a capital markets event
study methodology to test whether share prices reflect anticipated capital gain taxes.  On May 2,
1997, the Clinton Administration and the Republican Congressional leaders announced
agreement concerning the general features of the fiscal 1998 federal budget.  Among other
changes, the accord included an unspecified reduction in the maximum statutory capital gains tax
rate for individuals.  No adjustment in the ordinary tax rate on dividend income was proposed.
This event potentially offers a more powerful test of capital gains tax capitalization than the
exemptions examined by Amoako-Adu, et al. (1992) because the capital gains tax rate affects all
individual investors, no matter their amount of capital gains.4
If expected capital gains taxes are capitalized in equity prices and news of the agreement
had not leaked to the market, then stock prices should have responded differentially to the
announcement depending on the market’s assessment of the likelihood that the lower rate would
affect shareholder taxes.  Consistent with Amoako-Adu, et. al (1992), Harris and Kemsley
(1999), and Collins and Kemsley (1998), this study uses dividend yields to proxy for the value-
relevance of the expected capital gains tax.  Investors are assumed to place less (more) value-
relevance on the expected capital gains tax rate when assessing firms with higher (lower)
dividend yields.  If equity prices reflect expected capital gains taxes, stock returns around the
announcement should be negatively correlated with dividend yields.
2
Consistent with investors discounting share prices for expected capital gains taxes, we
find returns are decreasing in dividend yields.  During the week of the budget accord, the mean
return was 12 percent for non-dividend-paying stocks and 6 percent for dividend-paying stocks.
The spread exceeded the difference between the groups for any week from January 1995 to the
week in question.  No similar price movements were detected in the weeks preceding or
following the accord.  Results hold after controlling for the normal covariability between
dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms.  Among dividend-paying firms, stock returns
are negatively correlated with dividend yields.
The inferences of the paper suggest that none of the current perspectives fully explains
the role of shareholder taxes in equity valuation.  The results are inconsistent with both the
“traditional” view that non-tax benefits offset shareholder taxes and the tax-irrelevance
perspective (Miller and Scholes (1978)) that marginal investors are tax-exempt.  Instead the
                                               
2 The predictions are similar to discussions in the business press around the announcement.  An unnamed veteran
capital market strategist reportedly stated that the rate reduction “would attract investor attention even more toward
stocks with a high probability of capital appreciation and away from dividends.” (Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1997,
page C12).5
results suggest that anticipated shareholder taxes affect firm values.  However, the findings are
inconsistent with the exclusive role of dividends in the new view’s tax capitalization perspective.
Additional research is needed to assess the generalizability of these results beyond the capital
gains tax rate shock provided by the budget accord.
Finally, possible shareholder clientele effects are ignored throughout the paper.  One
explanation for the findings is that non-dividend-paying (and low-dividend) stocks are held by
shareholders that are subject to greater capital gains taxation than shareholders of other
companies.  Suppose a firm’s dividend yield varies with its shareholders’ tax status.  The
marginal investors in non-dividend-paying stocks may be individuals in the maximum personal
tax bracket and the marginal investors in other stocks may be pensions, tax-exempt
organizations, or foreigners, which are not subject to the capital gains tax rate.  If so, cuts in the
capital gains tax rate should increase the value of non-dividend-paying stocks more than other
stocks.
No tests of the clientele explanation are conducted in this study.  Determining whether
clientele effects explain the results are beyond the scope of this paper.  In particular, we do not
test the clientele explanation against an alternative explanation that shareholders are constant
across companies and the source of cross-firm variation is the proportion of shareholder profits
received in payments subject to the capital gains tax.  The findings in this study are consistent
with both explanations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the capital gains
taxes levied on secondary trades, liquidations, and share repurchases.  Section 3 provides
background information concerning the budget agreement and the capital gains tax rate
reduction.  Section 4 presents the empirical tests and results.  Concluding remarks follow.6
2. Capital Gains Taxes
2.1 Overview
Shareholder capital gains taxes are assessed on the difference between a stock’s sales
price and its investor’s tax basis.  Changes in expected capital gains tax rates could affect share
prices in at least three ways.  First, when companies repurchase shares from their shareholders on
an ongoing basis or at liquidation, capital gain taxes are levied on the difference between the
shareholder’s distribution and tax basis.  Thus, firm value varies with the dividend payout ratio
(i.e., the proportion of value realized in the liquidating event) and the capital gains tax rate.
3
Second, secondary trading affects firm value because it accelerates capital gains taxes that could
have been deferred until the company liquidated.  Third, even if all profits are distributed and
taxed as dividends (i.e., the liquidating distribution creates zero capital gains), investors who
realize their profits in the secondary markets will be taxed at the capital gains rate.
The following example illustrates the potential interplay between dividend policy and
capital gains rates in a two-period context.  Suppose the firm has a $10 investment that earns $1
after corporate tax during a year, at the end of which it liquidates.  Investors face a 40 percent
ordinary income tax rate and a 40 percent capital gains rate.
In this scenario, the dividend payout policy could affect returns in two ways.  First,
assume that investors buy and hold through liquidation.  Then, if the firm has a 100 percent
dividend payout ratio, the after-tax cash flow to the investor at the end of the year is $1 x (1-
40%) + $10=$10.60.  Assuming a 6 percent after-tax cost of capital, the value of the investment
                                               
3 For ease of exposition, references to shares repurchased in a liquidating event include shares repurchased during
the life of the company since they receive similar tax treatment.7
at the beginning of year is $10.60/1.06=$10.  For this firm, a change in capital gains rates would
have no effect on its value unless it affected the attractiveness of alternative investments.
Moreover, if the firm does not pay dividends, $11 is distributed at liquidation and the
investor still receives $1 x (1-40%) + $10=$10.60.  Assuming the same cost of capital, the price
at the beginning of year 1 remains $10.60/1.06 = $10.  However, suppose at the beginning of the
year, it is announced that the capital gains tax rate drops immediately to 20 percent.  Assuming
the cost of capital is unchanged, the price becomes $10.80/1.06 = $10.19, an announcement day
return of $0.19/$10 = 1.9%.
4  In this case, the announcement day return occurs because the
liquidating event will be taxed at the capital gains rate.
5
However, capital gains treatment for the liquidating distribution is not necessary to
achieve the same price response.  Consider the following three scenarios.  In the first case,
earnings are distributed through a $1 dividend at the end of year 1 (i.e., all distributions are
treated as dividends).  As shown above, if there is no trading, the price at the beginning of the
period is $10.  In the second case, suppose immediately following receipt of the dividend, the
investor sells the stock.  The new investor receives $10 and pays no tax.  The original investor
receives $10 + $0.60 = $10.60 making the original investment worth $10.60/1.06 = $10.  Prices
are unaffected by capital gains tax rates in either situation.
In the third case, assume the firm pays no dividend prior to liquidation and that the
investor sells the share immediately prior to liquidation.  The purchaser of the share would be
willing to pay $11 because he would receive $11 in the final distribution and pay no taxes.  The
                                               
4 In this case, the relatively small return is a consequence of the assumption that the firm only has a one-year life.
For a multi-year lived firm, the return would be higher.
5 The preceding assumes that the discount rate is unaffected by the tax rate change.  If the discount rate increases as
a consequence of a capital gains rate cut, the reaction for companies with capital gains distributions would be
smaller but the price reaction for companies with ordinary income distributions would be negative (rather than zero)
so the implication that the firms with capital gains distributions outperform those with ordinary income distributions
would remain unchanged.8
seller (original investor) would receive $11 and pay $0.40 in taxes.  Consequently, the original
investor would be willing to pay $10 for the original investment if the capital gains tax rate were
40 percent.  If the capital gains rate dropped to 20 percent, the price would increase to
$10.80/1.06 = $10.19.
These examples illustrate several facts.  First, differential taxes on capital gains and
dividends can have valuation implications.  Second, those valuation implications can result
because dividends are taxed differently from both liquidating distributions and secondary trades.
Third, in the face of secondary trading or liquidating distributions, share prices will react
positively to the announcement of a capital gains tax reduction if the firm has appreciated in
value.  Fourth, the magnitude of the stock price reaction to an announced reduction in capital
gains tax rates will be decreasing in the dividend payout ratio of the firm.  A more general model
of secondary trading effects is detailed in the following section.
2.2 Model of Secondary Trading
A concurrent study, Collins and Kemsley (1998), extends Ohlson’s (1995) residual-
income valuation model to incorporate the capital gains taxes from secondary trading into equity
prices.  We adopt a different modeling approach but reach a similar conclusion.  Both papers
assume stock prices rise if firms do not immediately distribute all internally generated cash flows
to shareholders.  This appreciation creates the potential for capital gains in the secondary market.
Suppose a firm has constant free cash flows of F per period.
6  If so, firm value at the
beginning of the life of the firm can be expressed as the present value of future free cash flows.
Firm value can also be expressed as the present value of shareholder distributions (D).  For
                                               
6 Similar implications would follow if cash flows were assumed to grow over time.  One can view our assumption as
normalizing cash flow growth to zero.9
simplicity, assume a distribution growth rate, (, that equates the two expressions for price.  This






















where ( reflects the required change in distributions over the life of the company needed to
distribute all corporate cash flows to shareholders.
Rearranging terms, we find that distribution growth rate is a function of the distribution
payout ratio (i.e., the dividend payout ratio if all distributions are taxed as dividends):










The share price at time t (Pt) equals the expected dividends at t+1, after shareholder
dividend taxes (J
d), plus the anticipated sales price at t+1 (Pt+1) less shareholder capital gains
taxes (J
c) on the change in price, discounted at r:
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The share price at t+n is a function of the share price at t+n+1 for all n.  Thus, current
prices (P0) can be expressed as:
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The derivative in equation (9) is negative when F>D1.  In other words, if firms retain part
of their cash flow, a decrease in the capital gains tax rate increases their stock prices and the
extent of the price increases varies with their dividend payouts.  If all cash flows are distributed
as dividends (i.e., F=D1), then no profits are retained, the stock price remains constant, and the
derivative equals zero.  If distributions exceed cash flows (F<D1), then shareholders are facing
capital losses if they sell and a reduction in the rate lowers the value of the loss (assuming capital
losses offset capital gains).  Consequently, the derivative is positive.
To gauge the economic magnitude of the 1997 capital gains tax cut, assume a firm is
generating $25 of F and paying $5 of D.  Using the tax rates before the reduction (J
d=0.4,
J
c=0.28) and a discount rate of 10 percent, equation 7 provides a share price of $47.  Therefore,
the 1997 capital gains tax rate cut from 28 percent to 20 percent should have increased the price
of this company by approximately $7 (the derivative of 89 times 0.08) or 15 percent.11
2.3 Share Repurchases and Liquidating Dividends
Besides the capital gains taxes arising in secondary trading, capital gains taxes also are
levied when companies repurchase their stock and when they liquidate.  Unlike secondary trades,
share repurchases reduce (and liquidating distributions eliminate) the potential for future
dividend taxes.
All corporate profits (net of losses) eventually are included in taxable shareholders’
income and taxed at either the dividend tax rate or the capital gains tax rate.
7  The dividend tax
rate applies to distributions from accumulated or current “earnings and profits” (E&P), which is
taxable income adjusted to approximate economic income.  Dividends are taxed in the year
received at the ordinary income tax rate.  Shareholder taxes on earnings not paid out in dividends
are deferred until distributed.
Eventual dividend taxation is unaltered by secondary trading.  Purchasers of shares in the
secondary market acquire the company with its prior owners’ E&P (and thus potential dividend
taxation) intact.  Although the secondary market for equity creates capital gains and losses for
sellers, it leaves corporate E&P undisturbed for determining future dividend taxes.
If companies avoid share repurchases and distribute nothing at liquidation, all net
earnings are eventually paid out in dividends, and taxation at ordinary rates is inevitable.  This is
the foundation of public finance’s “new” view of tax capitalization.  This view asserts investors
bid down the price of equity to reflect the dividend taxes payable upon distribution of E&P (e.g.,
Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981), and King (1977)).  All distributions are assumed to face
                                               
7 Three primary shareholder exceptions to this general rule are: (1) qualified pension plans whose beneficiaries are
taxed at the ordinary tax rate on all distributions, (2) tax-exempt organizations, such as universities and churches,
which avoid all taxes on investments, and (3) many foreign investors whose returns are governed by treaty
provisions and foreign tax laws and are not be subject to U.S. tax law.12
dividend taxation.  Consequently, the potential for share repurchases and liquidations to reduce
E&P, and thus avoid dividend taxes, is ignored.
Earnings, however, need not eventually be paid out in dividends.  In fact, the mean
dividend payout for U.S. companies is less than 20 percent of current earnings with the median
company paying no dividends.  Instead, firms can distribute corporate profits and reduce E&P
without shareholders facing dividend taxes.  For example, companies can buy their own stock.  If
the purchase is not pro-rata, the redemption reduces E&P, and shareholders are taxed on the
difference between the proceeds and their tax basis (cost) in the stock at the capital gains tax
rate.
8  Liquidations following taxable asset acquisitions or special elections following stock
acquisitions also eliminate E&P.
The extent to which these opportunities for converting distributions from dividend taxes
to capital gains taxes affect firm values is an empirical question.  However, if the market expects
earnings ultimately to receive capital gains treatment, valuation should be decreasing in capital
gains tax rates.  The appendix reviews the extant empirical literature to assess the frequency that
firms utilize share repurchases, liquidations following taxable asset acquisitions, and special
elections following stock acquisitions.
2.4 An Alternative Perspective
Contrary to the preceding predictions, numerous articles in the business press around the
budget accord asserted that the capital gains tax reduction would lower stock prices in the short
                                               
8 The buyback reduces E&P by the ratable portion of the company redeemed.  For example, if a firm’s E&P are $10,
redeeming 30 percent of its stock reduces E&P by $3.  If shares are acquired at a discount to their tax book value
(E&P plus contributed and paid-in capital), less E&P are extinguished.  For example, assume the company’s E&P
are $10 and other capital is $6.  If 30 percent of the company is redeemed for $2, E&P are reduced by only $1.25
[(10/10+6)*2).13
run because shareholders would respond to the rate reduction by selling appreciated properties.
For example, the Wall Street Journal (May 5, 1997, page C1) reported “. . ., a burst of selling
may hit the markets, strategies say.  That could be the reaction, at least temporarily, as investors
with big long-term profits rush to lock in their gains.”  Earlier in the year, the Wall Street Journal
(February 19, 1997, page A1) reported that policymakers were advocating a January 1 effective
date for any capital gains tax rate reductions “to avoid possible market disruptions that might
come from investors delaying transactions in anticipation of a future effective date.”
Under certain circumstances, stock prices can be shown to be increasing in capital gains
tax rates if capital gains taxes are viewed as transaction costs for which sellers demand
compensation from buyers.  A cut in the capital gains tax rate reduces the required
compensation, lowering the costs of acquiring shares and thus lowers stock prices.
For example, suppose a shareholder has a reservation price R, at which he is indifferent
between holding and selling the stock and which is unaffected by the change in capital gains
rates.
9  Assume the shareholder is subject to a capital gains tax rate of g and has a tax basis in the








At any price less than P, the shareholder will refuse to sell, hold the stock, avoid the capital gains
tax, and collect dividends.  Under this model, it is simple to show that stock prices are increasing













                                               
9 Such a reservation price might exist, for example, because the holders’ alternative to selling is to hold the stock
and collect dividends in perpetuity at ordinary income rates.  To the extent the alternative is to hold the stock for a
more limited time and collect dividends, then sell and pay tax at the new capital gains tax rate, the effect would be
mitigated.14
If the reservation price exceeds the share’s tax basis, the derivative is positive, indicating that a
decrease in the capital gains tax rate will reduce the price that the shareholder will demand to sell
his stock, potentially resulting in a price decline.
We are unaware of any study that provides evidence directly supporting this
characterization of stock prices and capital gains tax rates.  However, Landsman and Shackelford
(1995) provide similar evidence in their examination of RJR Nabisco’s stock price during its
1989 leveraged buyout.  They find a negative correlation between the price of RJR Nabisco’s
stock and the average tax basis of the shares sold during the 76 trading days from initiation to
completion of its buyout.  In other words, shareholders facing larger capital gains taxes
demanded higher prices during the buyout than shareholders facing smaller capital gains taxes.
A logical conclusion from their study is the compensation to cover the capital gains taxes would
have been less if the capital gains tax rate had been reduced.  Whether their findings in a tender
offer generalize to other settings is unclear.  The evidence, presented later in this paper, is
inconsistent with this view in that non-dividend stocks (which are likely to produce higher
capital gains on sale) react positively to the capital gains rate drop.
3. Development of the Budget Agreement’s Capital Gains Tax Rate Reduction
President Clinton was reelected in 1996 without endorsing a capital gains tax rate cut,
and his 1998 budget, introduced in March 1997, did not propose to reduce the capital gains tax
rate.  However, commentators speculated that the President might accept a capital gains tax rate
reduction in 1997 in exchange for Republican concessions on other issues.  In March 1997,
Speaker Newt Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott dampened expectations of a
capital gains tax rate cut, stating that a balanced budget must take precedent over any tax cuts.15
Although Gingrich softened his statements following an outcry by conservative Republicans, it
remained uncertain whether a balanced budget was feasible, not to mention a capital gains tax
rate reduction.  On March 19, House Ways and Means Committee Chair William Archer said
that if a tax bill were enacted in 1997, “there is no greater than a 50-50 chance” it would include
reductions in the capital gains tax rate (Tax Notes, March 24, 1997).
In April 1997, the Administration and the Republican leadership released little public
information about the ongoing, private budget negotiations.  On April 30 the Congressional
Budget Office reduced its estimate of the 1997 deficit by $45 billion and stated that annual
revisions of “similar amounts” were appropriate for years 1998-2002.  The CBO’s
announcement was a major surprise because no revision was scheduled until August.
The next day the Wall Street Journal and New York Times announced that a budget
agreement was imminent.  Both newspapers speculated that the CBO’s new projections had
enabled the President and Congress to balance the budget without forgoing desired expenditure
programs and tax cuts.
10  The following day, May 2, the President and Congressional leaders
announced an agreement to balance the budget by 2002 and, among other things, reduce the
capital gains tax rate.  At the announcement OMB Director Raines admitted that the revision had
enabled the negotiators to “make some adjustments.”  He stated that the revision had provided an
additional tax revenue, enabling a balanced budget in 2002.  On May 7, Senate Finance
Chairman William Roth and House Ways and Mean Chairman William Archer jointly
announced that the effective date for any capital gains tax cut would be May 7.
                                               
10 In reviewing the factors that ended “a two-year budget stalemate begun with the House Contract with America,”
Tax Notes (May 5, 1997, p. 607) concluded, “In the end, negotiations may have been helped most by news from
congressional analysts of an unexpected windfall of approximately $200 billion from a stronger economy over the
next five years than earlier predicted.”16
The capital gains tax rate was not specified in the agreement, but the business press
immediately began to speculate that maximum rates between 15 percent and 20 percent were
likely, down from the current rate of 28 percent.  After three months of haggling over details, the
general features of the May budget agreement were codified in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
(TRA 97).
11  Among other changes, it lowered the individual maximum long-term capital gains
tax rate to 20 percent.
The sudden budget agreement following the CBO’s unexpected revisions potentially
provides an unusually powerful setting for assessing the value relevance of U.S. taxes.  Typically
U.S. tax legislation is constructed over long periods--many months or even years.  Information
leaks during policy deliberations impede identification of an event period and thwart successful
use of conventional event study methodology.  This study’s research design assumes that the
information about future capital gains tax rates was dispersed to market participants in a
sufficiently brief period that conventional capital market methodologies can detect the effect of
capital gains taxes on firm values.
Generally, such methodologies have been relegated to tax changes in parliamentary
governments (e.g., Amoako-Adu, et al. (1992)) where tax and budget information is strictly
confidential and information links can result in removal of top government officials.
12  One
exception is Cutler (1988), who tests for a market response to each house’s passage of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.  Failing to detect a large market response, he concludes, “These results
                                               
11 Confirming general enactment of the budget agreement, Tax Notes (July 28, 1997, p.445) commented in the latter
days of negotiation that “They’ll disagree on this and on that, but in the end, they’ll make a deal.  And it will
basically be the same deal the President and Republican leaders agreed to back in May.”
12 Tillinger and Loudder (1994) demonstrate the difficulty of using event studies to evaluate tax legislation.  They
report that abnormal stock returns of companies not paying dividends exceeded abnormal returns of companies
paying dividends in 1992 and 1993.  They link this two-year (the event period) differential to 1993 legislation that
increased the tax rate applied to dividends without changing the capital gains tax rate.  Although the conclusion is
consistent with the finding in this paper, the length of the event period impedes their ability to rule out alternative
explanations.17
leave unanswered questions about what the tax news meant to the market, and whether the news
was efficiently incorporated in stock prices (p. 1108).”
One possible explanation for Culter (1988)’s weak results is that it may have taken time
for investors to price the complex revisions in 1986 tax reform.
13  If so, our study may find a
stronger price response to taxes because the valuation implications of the relatively simple 1997
capital gains tax rate cut should have been more quickly impounded into price.
14
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1  Research Design
The empirical analysis is based on the observation that, if expected capital gains tax rates
affect valuation, then stock prices should increase for firms on the announcement of the budget
agreement, and particularly so for firms that pay less in dividends.  The basic regression is:
Return = a + b1 Dividend Variable + b2 Control Variables + e (12)
The return is computed over the five-day period, Tuesday, April 29, 1997 through
Monday, May 5, 1997, during which most of the uncertainty surrounding the budget agreement
was resolved.  One advantage of the budget agreement for this analysis is that few specific
provisions in the agreement (other than the capital gains change) clearly benefit one group of
firms over another and, hence, potentially confound the analysis.  Nevertheless, a series of
control variables is added to mitigate the possibility that omitted correlated variables spuriously
affect the study’s inferences.
                                               
13 Consistent with this explanation, Plumlee (1997) shows that the complexity of the 1986 Act impeded financial
analysts’ forecast accuracy.
14 Besides the cut in the capital gains tax rate, the only major tax changes in the accord were a child tax credit, estate
tax relief, and education tax incentives.  Expanded IRAs were included in the final bill.18
The dividend variable captures the presence of (or extent of) dividend payments.  To the
extent the change in expected capital gains tax rates affects valuation, the effect should be most
pronounced for firms that are less likely to pay dividends, all else equal.  Thus, b1 is the
coefficient of primary interest and is expected to be negative.
The analysis is based on the 2,000 largest U.S. corporations as reported by Datastream.
Of the 1,975 sample firms with complete data, 728 (37 percent) pay dividends.  For those firms,
the mean dividend yield is 2.8 percent.  Table 1 presents additional descriptive statistics.
4.2 Dividend Status Regressions
The initial regression investigates the stock price change of dividend-paying and non-
dividend-paying stocks, as follows:
Return = a + b1 Dividend Dummy + e (13)
Because dividend initiations and omissions are rare, past dividend status is assumed to predict
future status and, hence, the impact of capital gains tax rate changes on investors.
The simple regression results in Table 2, Column A suggest dividend status is an
important explanatory variable for stock price reactions to the budget accord.  As predicted, the
coefficient on the dividend variable is negative (-6.24 with a t-statistic of -17.1), indicating non-
dividend-paying companies outperformed dividend-paying companies during the event week.
The mean return over the week in question is 6 percent for dividend-paying stocks and 12
percent for the non-dividend-paying firms.  The return differential is consistent with the capital
gains tax reduction being particularly good news for non-dividend-paying stocks.
15
                                               
15 Specification tests, detailed below, confirm this conclusion.  Results are robust to inclusion of a variety of control
variables including industry, leverage, prior stock performance, and beta.19
To assess the uniqueness of this week’s differential stock response, equation (13) was
reestimated for every week between January 1995 and the event week.  Of those 129 weeks, the
coefficient on the dummy variable in the event week was the largest in absolute terms,
suggesting that, whatever occurred during the week was highly unusual.  However, one potential
remaining concern is that non-dividend-paying stocks always react more strongly to factors that
move the market.  If so, the large difference between dividend and non-dividend-paying stocks
may be solely attributable to the increase in stock prices during the week of the accord.
To control for the normal covariability between dividend and non-dividend stocks, we
estimate a regression of each firm’s weekly return for the 129 weeks from January 1995 through
the event week (239,296 observations) on two variables:  (a) the average return for dividend-
paying stocks during the week and (b) a categorical variable for non-dividend-paying stocks in
the event week.  Inclusion of the average return for dividend-paying stocks should control for
normal covariability.  The categorical variable should capture any “abnormal” returns to non-
dividend stocks relative to dividend stocks during the event week.
The coefficient on the categorical variable is 5.79, indicating that non-dividend stocks
outperformed dividend stocks after controlling for the normal covariability between dividend and
non-dividend stocks.  The coefficient estimate is only slightly less than the 6.24 coefficient in
Table 2, Panel A, and remains statistically significant.  Results are qualitatively insensitive to
alternative specifications of the abnormal returns model.
The positive market return for both dividend-paying firms and non-dividend-paying firms
during the week is consistent with the budget agreement being good news for the market as a
whole.  During the week, the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose 6 percent and the Nasdaq20
Composite rose 10 percent.
16  However, readers should be cautious to infer that the tax cut
increased stock prices because the budget accord occurred in the early stages of a surge in stock
prices.  Specifically, the Dow Jones Industrial Average climbed from under 6400 in mid-April to
over 8200 in early August.  Nevertheless, the week in question did account for 58 percent of the
Dow’s increase and 67 percent of the rise in the Nasdaq Composite in April and May.  In
addition, the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Nasdaq Composite were largely unchanged
in the week preceding and the week following the agreement.  The DJIA rose 2 (1) percent in the
week preceding (following) the accord week.  The Nasdaq rose 1 (0) percent in the week
preceding (following) the accord week.  Moreover, a casual review of the business press during
that week reveals no particularly newsworthy events, other than the accord.  Thus, the evidence
suggests that investors viewed the budget agreement as favorable regardless of dividend status.
At a minimum, the sharp rise in share prices following the accord overwhelmed any
possible sell-off of appreciated securities.  Recall that the business press widely reported that the
capital gains tax rate cut would unleash selling pressure that would drive down the prices of
stocks that had already appreciated.  In addition, this paper provides no evidence supporting a
reduction in transaction costs, arising from sellers demanding less compensation for capital gains
taxes following the rate reduction.  The results imply that any downward price movement caused
by sell-offs or by reduced transaction costs was more than offset by upward price pressures.
Specifically, the DJIA increased on May 7, the effective date for the lower rates, and during the
                                               
16 In the spirit of this paper, the Wall Street Journal (April 25, 1997) reported that Brian Wesbury, chief economist
at the Chicago bond firm of Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, was characterizing the Nasdaq Composite as an
indicator of the market’s expectations of the future capital gains tax rate, “a little cap-gains futures contract.”
Wesbury had related movements in the Nasdaq since November 1996 to changes in the probability of a capital gains
tax rate reduction.  The DJIA was termed less sensitive to capital gains tax changes because its stocks “throw off a
relatively heavy share of their profits in dividends.”21
week beginning with May 7.  By the end of the month, the DJIA (Nasdaq) had risen 1.6 (4.8)
percent since May 6.
Rough approximations using the regression coefficient estimates provide some
confidence that coefficients are reasonable.  The coefficient on the dividend status variable can
be used to estimate the market’s expectation of the eventual capital gains tax rate reduction.  Let
8d equal the percentage of a dividend-paying stock’s value expected to be taxed as dividends,
and 8n equal the percentage of non-dividend-paying stock’s value expected to be taxed as
dividends.  Let )o equal the change in expected ordinary income tax rates, and )c equal the
change in the expected capital gains tax rate.  The reduction in firm value for dividend-paying
firms, relative to non-dividend-paying firms can be represented as: (8d - 8n) ()o - )c)"), where
)" is the change in the likelihood of a capital gains tax rate cut.
Assume the budget agreement did not affect expectations about future ordinary income
tax rates ()o = 0) and that the profits of the dividend-paying firms are taxed as dividends (8d = 1)
and the profits of the non-dividend-paying firms are taxed as capital gains (8n = 0).  Also assume
that the budget agreement shifted expectations about the capital gains tax cut from impossible to
certain ()" = 1).  Using these parameters, the regression coefficient implies that at the time of
the accord, the market anticipated future capital gains tax rates would fall by 6.24 percentage
points.  With a capital gains tax rate of 28 percent when the agreement was reached, the
coefficient suggests that the anticipated future capital gains tax rate was approximately 22
percent.  If some profits of dividend firms are expected to face capital gains taxation, the
regression coefficient implies a lower future capital gains tax rate.  For example, if 8d is 0.5, the
implied future capital gains tax rate is about 16 percent.  These simple estimates seem
reasonable.  Recall immediate speculation in the business press following the accord indicated an22
eventual capital gains tax rate between 15 and 20 percent.  TRA 97 reduced the capital gains rate
to 20 percent.
An alternative approach is to assume the budget agreement only shifted expectations
about passage of the bill.  That is, the market anticipated a 20 percent capital gains tax rate ()c =
8) if legislation passed.  Solving for )", the regression coefficient of –6.24 suggests that
agreement increased the probability of a tax cut by 78 percent.
4.3 Control Variables
While suggestive, the average returns in the simple regression do not control for the
possibility that other factors may have caused these differences in returns.  To ensure that other
factors are not driving the results, the regression is modified to include several control variables.
The choice of control variables is somewhat ad hoc because theory is insufficiently rich to
proscribe other effects of the tax rate change.  The controls are:
Size = log of market value as of April 28, 1997;
Debt/Assets = total liabilities divided by total assets at year-end 1996;
Return on Assets = 1996 net income divided by year-end total assets;
Book/Market Ratio = book value divided by market value of equity at year-end 1996.
Size is designed to ensure that the results are not caused by smaller, non-dividend-paying
firms outperforming larger, dividend-paying firms.  Debt/Assets is included to control for
differences in leverage across firms.
17  Return on assets is designed to capture differences in
profitability across firms.
18  Book/Market ratio is included to control for differences in
                                               
17 Results are consistent if debt is divided by market or book value of equity or if leverage is measured as interest
expense divided by market value.
18 Results are qualitatively unaltered if net income is deflated by total assets or book value of equity.23
unrecognized assets, growth prospects and risk across firms.
19  All control variables are collected
from Compustat.
20  To avoid extreme observations, values of Debt/Assets, Return on Assets and
Book/Market are trimmed at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles.  Inferences are insensitive to this
trimming.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the control variables, split between dividend-
paying and non-dividend-paying stocks.  Not surprisingly, dividend-paying stocks are larger, on
average, more highly levered (median debt/asset ratios of 0.42 versus 0.64), more profitable
(median ROA of 13.76 percent versus 10.8 percent respectively), and have higher book/market
ratios (0.33 versus 0.18) implying lower expected earnings growth.  t-tests of the mean control
variables for the two groups are significantly different at conventional levels; however, for each
control variable, the two distributions overlap substantially.
Table 2, Column B, shows results including the control variables.  Two facts are
noteworthy.  First, although the coefficient estimate on the dividend indicator variable drops
from –6.24 to –5.72, it remains strongly negative suggesting that differences in returns are not
driven primarily by the control variables.  Second, only debt/assets and book/market are
significantly related to returns (both negatively).
To our knowledge, the impact of the budget agreement and its capital gains tax rate cut
should not have varied substantially across industrial sectors.  However, to ensure that the results
are not caused by differences across industries, Table 2, Column C reports results using industry
indicator variables.  Specifically, firms are split into financial, extractive, manufacturing, utilities
                                               
19 Book/Market is employed rather than the inverse to avoid extreme values for firms with book values of equity
close to zero, however, inferences are insensitive to this choice.
20 The number of observations drops slightly for the regressions including the control variables because Compustat
data are unavailable for every sample firm.24
and services sectors based on their Datastream level 3 industry codes.  Again, inferences are
unaffected.  Only the indicator variable for the extractive industries is statistically significant.
To determine whether the results are robust across industries, the simple regression was
reestimated for each industry separately.  The relation between stock returns and the dividend
indicator variable is significantly negative in each industry, except the extractive industry where
it is insignificant.  To ensure that results are not driven by the coarseness of the industry
partition, firms are split into finer partitions, up to Datastream level 6 industry codes that divide
firms into eighty-three groupings.  Results are always consistent.
Finally, unreported regressions show that inferences are unaltered when the explanatory
variables include beta or the percentage change in stock prices over various combinations of the
months preceding the event period.  In addition, excluding firms that went ex-dividend during
the examination period does not qualitatively affect the results.
4.4 Dividend Yield Regressions
Table 3, Column A, shows results for the following regression estimated only for
dividend-paying stocks:
Return = a + b1 Dividend Yield + e (14)
The regression coefficient on the dividend yield is significantly negative, indicating that
current dividend yields are correlated with stock price performance during the budget
reconciliation week.
21  The coefficient estimate is –0.51, indicating that a 1 percentage point
                                               
21Tests in the preceding section assume current dividend-paying status predicts future dividend-paying status.
Likewise, tests in this section assume current dividend yields are correlated with future yields.  Payouts are
imperfect measures, however, to the extent dividend yields vary with past performance and past market movements.
For example, because dividend changes lag returns, low dividend yield firms are more likely to have experienced
recent stock appreciation.25
decrease in the dividend payout ratio results in approximately a one-half percentage point larger
stock price increase on the announcement of the budget agreement.
Conclusions are unaffected by inclusion of the control variables from Columns B and C
of Table 2.  Table 3, Column B shows the coefficient on dividend yield drops slightly is –0.42,
but remains statistically negative.  Only market value is also statistically significant.  Table 3,
Column C, reports results including industry indicator variables.  The coefficient estimate on
dividend yield is –0.45.  None of the industry indicators is statistically significant.  Moreover,
when equation (14) is estimated separately for each industry, the coefficient on dividend yield is
always significantly negative, except utilities where it is marginally significantly negative and
consumer goods where it is negative but insignificant.
A simple model of discounted cash flows suggests that the regression coefficient
estimates are reasonable, i.e., consistent with the market correctly anticipating the magnitude of
the capital gains tax cut.  Assuming all corporate earnings (E) are distributed annually as either
dividends (D), subject to the ordinary income tax rate (td), or as redemptions, subject to the
capital gains tax rate (tg), share prices (P) can be expressed as:
( ) [ ] ) 15 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1
g d t D E t D r P - - + - = -
where r is the discount rate (after corporate and shareholder taxes).  First differencing equation










Let the derivative equal the regression coefficient of –0.51 (from Column A), tg1 equal
0.28 (the prior capital gains tax rate) and tg2 equal 0.20 (the current capital gains tax rate).  Using
these parameters, the equation holds with a discount rate of 16 percent, which does not seem
unreasonable.  Alternatively, assuming a smaller discount rate of 10 percent, the regression26
coefficient implies that capital markets differentiated among dividend-paying stocks around the
budget agreement as if they anticipated a future capital gains tax rate of 23 percent.
To investigate further the relation between dividends and the reaction to the budget
agreement, dividend-paying stocks are split into quartiles based on dividend yields, where:
DUM1 = 1 if dividend yield is greater than zero but below 1.18 percent,
DUM2 = 1 if dividend yield is between 1.18 percent and 2.07 percent,
DUM3 = 1 if dividend yield is between 2.07 percent and 3.40 percent, and
DUM4 = 1 if dividend yield is greater than 3.40 percent.
Table 4 shows a monotonic relation between dividend yields and the weekly stock return.




th quartiles had returns that were lower by 1.77 percentage points, 2.13 percentage points and
3.30 percentage points, respectively.  Again, inclusion of control variables (Column B) and
industry indicator variables (Column C) do not affect the inferences.
5. Conclusions
Prior studies generally have ignored the effect of anticipated shareholder taxes on firm
values or limited the focus to dividend taxes.  This paper presents evidence consistent with
capital gains taxes significantly affecting share prices during a week when expected capital gains
tax rates likely were revised downward.  Regression summary statistics show that stock prices
moved inversely with dividend yields when the 1997 budget reconciliation was reached.  The
share prices of firms not currently paying dividends increased approximately 6 percentage points
more over a five-day window than the share prices of other firms.  Among firms paying
dividends, the change in share prices was decreasing in dividend yields.  Results are robust to a27
battery of sensitivity checks, mitigating concerns that inferences are affected by omitted factors
that are correlated with dividend yields.
The results are consistent with at least two related explanations.  First, to the extent a
stock’s returns are expected to be taxed as capital gains, a reduction in the expected capital gains
tax rate enhances the attractiveness of the investment to investors.  Second, to the extent a firm’s
stock is held by shareholders subject to the capital gains tax, a reduction in the expected capital
gains tax rate increases its market value.  The findings present evidence consistent with neither a
sell-off of appreciated securities following the rate reduction nor a reduction in the compensation
for capital gains taxes that selling shareholders demand from buyers.  The upward price pressure
around the accord dominated any downward price pressure imposed by these factors.
These findings do not fit nicely with any of the current models relating equity valuations
and shareholder taxes.  Unlike the traditional and tax-irrelevance views, the findings are
consistent with capitalization of shareholder taxes.  However, unlike the new view, the results
suggest capitalization of shareholder taxes extends beyond dividend taxes to include capital gains
taxes.  Because dividend yields are zero for many companies and approach zero for others, tax
capitalization of expected capital gains taxes may be an important, previously overlooked,
component of equity pricing.28
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th Per. Med. 75
th Per.
Non-Dividend Stocks
Return (percent) 12.2 4.6 10.7 18.7
Log(MV) 6.76 6.12 6.55 7.25
Debt/Assets 0.45 0.24 0.42 0.61
Return on Assets 6.62 3.36 10.80 17.45
Book/Market 0.23 0.06 0.18 0.35
Dividend Stocks
Return (percent) 6.0 3.2 5.5 8.1
Log(MV) 7.49 6.51 7.28 8.22
Debt/Assets 0.63 0.50 0.64 0.78
Return on Assets 14.13 9.93 13.76 18.47
Book/Market 0.37 0.18 0.33 0.52
Dividend Yield (percent) 2.8 1.2 2.1 3.4
Returns are computed over the 5 days, 4/29/97-5/5/97.  Log(MV) is the log of market value as of 4/28/97.
Debt/Assets is total long-term debt divided by total assets.  Return on assets is net income divided by total
assets.  Book/Market is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity as of 4/28/97.
Dividend Yield is the most recent quarterly dividend, annualized and divided by market value on 4/28/97.31
TABLE 2
Regression Coefficient Estimates (t-statistics) for All Sample Firms with
Dividend Indicator Variable
                                                            A                                     B                                    C
Intercept 12.20 14.13 16.07
  (42.0) (10.2) (10.5)


















Consumer Goods Indicator -1.64
(-1.9)
N 1971 1465 1465
 Adjusted R
2 0.13 0.18 0.19
The regression in Column A is: Return = a + b1 Dividend Indicator + e.  The regression in Column B
includes control variables and the regression in Column C adds industry indicator variables.  All variables
are defined as in table 1 except for the dividend indicator, which assumes a value of one if the firm paid a
dividend within the prior year, and the industry indicator variables, which assume a value of one if the
firm is in that Datastream level 3 industry code.32
TABLE 3
Regression Coefficients (t-statistics) for Dividend-Paying Firms Including Dividend Yield
                                                             A                                    B                                     C
Intercept 7.37 5.17 4.98
(36.8) (4.93) (4.1)
Div. Yield -0.51 -0.42 -0.45
(-9.3) (-5.8) (-5.4)


















N 1244 927 927
R
2 0.06 0.06 0.06
The regression in Column A is: Return = a + b1 Dividend Yield + e.  The regression includes only
dividend-paying stocks.  The regression in Column B includes control variables and the regression in
Column C adds industry indicator variables.  All variables are defined as in tables 1 and 2.33
TABLE 4
Regression Coefficients (t-statistics) by Dividend-Paying Firms, Including Dividend Yield Quartile
                                                             A                                     B                                    C
Intercept 7.76 5.23 4.98
(29.7) (5.0) (4.1)
2
nd Quartile -1.77 -1.91 -1.87
(-4.8) (-4.8) (-4.7)
3
rd Quartile -2.13 -2.01 -1.92
(-5.8) (-4.9) (-4.7)
4
th Quartile -3.30 -2.75 -2.66
(-8.9) (-6.4) (-5.7)


















N 1244 927 927
R
2 0.06 0.06 0.07
The regression in Column A is: Return = a + b1 2
nd Quartile + b2 3
nd Quartile + b3 4
th Quartile + e.  The
regression includes only dividend-paying stocks.  The regression in Column B includes control variables
and the regression in Column C adds industry indicator variables.  All variables are defined as in tables 1
and 2 except the quartiles, which take on a value of one if the dividend yield over the prior year is in that
quartile.34
Appendix
Do Firms Eliminate E&P and Avoid Dividend Taxation?
This appendix reviews the empirical documentation to determine the extent to which
firms exercise their options for converting dividend taxation into capital gains taxation.  The
three primary options are share repurchases, liquidations following taxable asset acquisitions,
and special elections following stock acquisitions.
The importance of share repurchases as a source of returns to shareholders is unclear.
Bagwell and Shoven (1989) report that 1987 redemptions totaled $53 billion, up 824 percent
from 1977.  They show that from 1985-1987 total repurchases were 60 percent of total
dividends.  Auerbach and Hassett (1997) counter that redemptions have become less important.
They report that by the mid-1990s, only 5-10 percent of companies repurchased shares.
Taxable asset acquisitions also provide opportunities to avoid eventual dividend taxation.
Corporate liquidations typically follow asset acquisitions.  In liquidations, the company
terminates and distributes all assets to its shareholders and the E&P expire.
22  A shareholder is
taxed at the capital gains tax rate on the difference between his liquidating distribution and his
tax basis.
Taxable asset acquisitions, however, are rare.
23  Typically, acquirers purchase the stock
of a company, rather than its assets.  Neither taxable nor tax-free stock acquisitions affect
targets’ E&P.
However, acquirers can elect to eliminate the target’s E&P in stock acquisitions through
provisions in Internal Revenue Code section 338 and section 338(h)(10).  Effectively treating
                                               
22 E&P are unaffected and no capital gains tax is generated if the shareholder is a corporation owning at least 80
percent of its subsidiary’s stock.
23 For example, of the 83 management buyouts from 1982-1986 examined in Schipper and Smith (1991), only two
reported using a taxable asset structure.35
stock acquisitions as asset acquisitions, the 338 election assumes acquired companies liquidate,
eliminating earnings and profits, and then reincorporate.  According to John Parker, then director
of valuation services for Arthur Young, 338 elections eliminated E&P in 17 of the 100 largest
acquisitions from 1982-1986 or 13 percent of the dollar value of the 100 transactions (Mergers
and Acquisitions, July/August 1986, p.19).  Since repeal of the General Utilities doctrine in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 338 elections are seldom tax-advantageous, even with elimination of
E&P.
24  Exceptions arise when the target can avoid taxation on the difference between the fair
market value of the assets and their tax bases (e.g., if the target has net operating losses).
However, companies with large net operating losses likely do not have substantial E&P.
A few studies indirectly estimate the E&P eliminated through share repurchases, taxable
asset structure, and 338 elections.  In their analysis of 83 going-private management buyouts
from 1982-1986, Schipper and Smith (1991) report that 11 buyouts were share redemptions and
28 other acquirers announced that they would step-up the tax basis of the acquired company.
Because any acquisition involving asset revaluation eliminates E&P, at least 39 of the
acquisitions eliminate E&P and avoid dividend taxation.  Thirty-four other buyouts did not
revalue, and no step-up information was found in the remaining ten transactions.  Consequently,
E&P were eliminated in 53 percent of the 73 private buyouts for which revaluation status was
known.
Tax advisers tell us that the elimination of E&P in going-private leveraged buyouts has
increased dramatically in recent years.  Wall Street consultants tell us that leveraged
recapitalizations with “338(h)(10)” elections, which extinguish E&P, have become the primary
                                               
24 The General Utilities doctrine exempted from corporate taxation any gains arising from step-up of the tax basis of
a target’s assets to fair market value.  Its repeal added a second layer of taxation to acquisitions that step-up tax
basis.36
acquisition structure for leveraged buyouts.  However, we are unaware of any empirical
documentation of their structures.
Conversely, Erickson (1998) finds little evidence of E&P elimination at acquisition
among publicly-traded companies.  Analyzing 340 acquisitions from 1985-1988 involving
publicly traded acquirers and targets, Erickson (1998) reports only seven acquirers disclosed
their intention to step-up the tax basis of the target’s assets.  Furthermore, he finds no link
between the tax benefits from asset revaluation and the likelihood that an acquisition is taxable.
Similarly, Auerbach and Reishus (1988) find no relation between the benefits of step-up and the
tax status of the acquisition in their analysis of 234 acquisitions from 1969-1982.  Because step-
up is required for E&P elimination, these studies suggest limited E&P elimination at acquisition.
On the other hand, Hayn’s (1989) analysis of 116 taxable acquisitions from 1970-1985
concludes that acquirers compensate target shareholders for the future tax reductions arising
from asset revaluation.  She reports a positive relation between the tax benefits to step-up and a
target firm’s announcement period returns.  Her findings imply that step-up is sufficiently
important to affect acquisition premiums.  At a minimum, it seems likely that step-up occurs
(and E&P are eliminated) following deals where acquirers bid for the opportunity to revalue.
In summary, the evidence is conflicting about the extent to which acquisitions eliminate
E&P.
25  In addition, because most studies investigate periods before the repeal of General
Utilities in 1986, their findings may not generalize to the present.  However, even if an
acquisition leaves E&P unaffected, dividend taxes are not inevitable.  The acquisition simply
perpetuates the accumulated E&P.  E&P extinguishment may yet arise with future redemptions,
                                               
25 Interestingly, none of the studies that assess the importance of revaluation on acquisitions includes an estimate of
the benefits from E&P extinguishment in their measures of the tax benefits from step-up.  The exclusion is
consistent with a belief that the benefits from extinguishment are either not quantifiable or trivial.37
taxable asset acquisitions, or stock purchases where firms elect to eliminate E&P.  At a
minimum, capital gains taxation applies to shareholder distributions at liquidation and E&P
expire without triggering dividend taxation.  Coupled with low dividend payouts, the potential
remains for considerable share appreciation to face eventual capital gains treatment.
A casual examination of corporate histories reveals the high likelihood that companies
will face an acquisition that presents an opportunity to eliminate E&P.  Fewer than 40 percent of
the firms covered by Compustat in 1976 existed in 1996, the vast majority purged through
acquisitions.  Moreover, most of these acquisitions provided an opportunity to eliminate E&P.
Sampling firms covered by Accounting Trends and Techniques, we find that a stable 90-92
percent of acquisitions from 1976-1996 used the purchase method of accounting for GAAP
purposes.  E&P elimination is possible for any acquisition using purchase accounting because
both taxable asset acquisitions and taxable stock acquisitions that elect E&P elimination use
purchase accounting.  Unfortunately, the publicly available financial statements do not provide
more specific information about E&P elimination at acquisition.
In summary, share repurchases, taxable asset acquisitions, and taxable stock acquisitions
electing asset revaluation provide opportunities to extinguish E&P and avoid eventual dividend
taxation.  The evidence suggests that these options are used; however, their frequency is unclear.
Unfortunately, the empirical documentation predates the period examined in the paper by nearly
a decade.  However, lacking contrary evidence, it seems reasonable to assume that substantial
portions of corporate value could avoid dividend taxation and be taxed as capital gains.